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Bears and Numbers
- Investigating whether short-sellers exploit accounting-based pricing anomalies
I. Introduction
This paper examines whether short-sellers (bears) exploit two prominent accounting-
based pricing anomalies, namely post-earnings-announcement-drift (PEAD) and the
accruals anomaly. In particular, I first examine whether the intensity of shorting is
related to the severity of the market's under- and over-reaction to quarterly earnings
and accruals, respectively. I find strong evidence that short sellers attempt to exploit
underreaction to unexpectedly poor earnings, and I find limited evidence that they
exploit overreaction to accruals. Then, holding anomalies constant, I assess whether
prices converge more quickly to their fundamental levels in the presence of shorting
and find mixed results.
The evidence on whether bears exploit pricing anomalies is mixed. Using the most
extensive data set to date, Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2004) contest the previously
documented underperformance of high short interest stocks. Dechow, Hutton,
Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001) document a strong relation between short interest and
ratios of fundamentals to prices, suggesting that short-sellers target overvalued
companies. As acknowledged by the authors, it is possible, however, that
fundamental-to-price ratios such as book-to-market reflect risk factors rather than
mispricing, so it is unclear whether short-sellers who trade based on such ratios are
actually exploiting pricing anomalies. By contrast, my study directly examines
whether bears exploit anomalies that are uncontroversial.
The most closely-related piece of research to my study is Richardson (2003), who
does not find evidence that short-sellers trade on the basis of information contained in
annual accruals. However, he studies the accrual anomaly in isolation. Both PEAD
and the accrual anomaly are closely related and can either augment or offset each
other. Failure to account for their coexistence greatly reduces the power of
Richardson (2003)'s tests. In this paper, I study both anomalies on a quarterly basis
and control for other determinants of short interest. Therefore I provide more
powerful multivariate tests of shorting behavior.
My study is the first to test whether short-sellers help eliminate accounting-based
overpricing anomalies. Given the considerable debate within both academic and
practitioner circles about the costs and benefits of shorting (see Chancellor, 2001, for
a review), this study is of particular interest to regulators and policy makers. I find
some evidence that short selling helps to expedite the return of overpriced stocks to
fundamental value, but this result is not particularly strong. I also find strong
evidence that shorting is not associated with price declines in stocks that are not
overpriced.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II develops my hypotheses
and their empirical implications in detail. Section III outlines the sample selection
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procedure, defines the variables, and describes the data. In Section IV, I discuss the
tests and present empirical results. Finally, Section V concludes.
II. Hypotheses Development
This section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection discusses the
interaction between PEAD and the accrual anomalies, which leads to my primary
hypothesis on the relation between short interest and accounting information (HI).
The second subsection develops my second set of hypotheses on the relation between
short interest and price convergence (H2 and H3).
11.1. Shorting and Accounting-Based Anomalies
Crunching numbers with a computer they took two years to program, Messrs. Jacobs
and Levy repeatedly scour 3,000 stocks looking for clues to each issue's future
direction ... With six advanced degrees between them, (they) used their academic
background in finance and computers to sort out dozens of anomalies supposedly
affecting stock-market prices... The trick, they say, is to weigh many anomalies at
once, untangle the effect of one factor from another ... One well-known anomaly is
that stocks often decline after companies report disappointing earnings. In
anticipation of this anomaly taking among bank stocks last fall, when the economic
outlook was highly uncertain, Jacobs Levy sold a lot of bank stocks short. In all, their
bank shorts accounted for an unusually large 11% of the firm's portfolio...."
[emphasis added]
- James White, The Wall Street Journal, March 20, 1991
This subsection first discusses the interaction between the PEAD and accrual
anomalies, and then develops my primary hypothesis on the relation between short
interest and accounting information.
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PEAD and the accrual anomaly are two prominent pricing anomalies that are based
on closely related pieces of accounting data. PEAD refers to the phenomenon
wherein stocks experience prolonged positive and negative abnormal returns (i.e.
"drift") during the two to three quarter period following the release of, respectively,
unexpectedly good and bad earnings news (i.e. "earnings surprise").1 The accrual
anomaly refers to the negative relation between the current level of accruals and
subsequent abnormal returns. Initial overreaction to accruals reverses when earnings
are reported in the following periods and the market learns that the accruals of the
previous period are not sustainable (e.g., Sloan, 1996).
Analyzing either one of the two aforementioned accounting-based anomalies in
isolation is problematic because the level of accruals embedded in earnings surprises
can either mitigate or exacerbate the amount of drift that follows an earnings surprise
(Collins and Hribar, 2000). If firms manage accruals to achieve earnings surprises,
the PEAD and the accrual anomaly tend to offset each other. Large negative (positive)
earnings surprises forecast negative (positive) abnormal returns subsequent to the
earnings announcement, but large negative (positive) accruals, which can cause
earnings to be lower (higher) than expected, forecast positive (negative) abnormal
returns. In contrast, if managers use accruals to smooth earnings, the accrual
mispricing effect tends to augment the drift that follows an earnings surprise. Large
negative earnings surprises forecast negative abnormal returns, which would be
augmented if large positive accruals were present. Similarly, large positive earnings
'Ball and Brown (1968) were the first detect the PEAD anomaly. Bernard and Thomas (1989 and
1990) provide the most comprehensive documentation.
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surprises forecast positive abnormal returns, which would be augmented if negative
accruals were present. Following Collins and Hribar (2000), I jointly study both the
accruals and PEAD anomolies, thereby increasing the power of my tests.
<Insert Figure 1 about here>
Figure 1 presents a summary of the above discussion and shows my predictions. If
bears are sophisticated investors who benefit from price declines (Dechow et al.,
2001; Desai et al., 2002), I expect them to take advantage of the predictable extreme
negative returns of stocks with positive accruals and negative earnings surprise, so
long as they do not perceive such stocks to be much riskier than others. Thus,
controlling for the transaction costs associated with shorting and other determinants
of short interest, I expect to observe higher short interest among the stocks with the
most extreme positive accruals and negative earnings surprises,. The persistence of
overpricing even in the presence of significant shorting activities would indicate that
other obstacles prevent the informational market inefficiencies from being arbitraged
away. For instance, Mashruwala, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2004) suggest that
idiosyncratic volatility could be one such an obstacle.
On the other hand, finding that accounting anomalies do not cause cross-sectional
variation in short interest would also be interesting. I propose two potential
explanations. First, it might be that bears are not exploiting these well-documented
anomalies because of risks or costs that I cannot observe. Alternatively, short interest
might be a noisy proxy for the presence of bearish views. Shorting occurs for many
reasons other than bears' view that the stock is overpriced. For example, market
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makers and block traders will short for technical reasons in order to maintain
liquidity. To the extent that shorting is also attributable to these other activities, the
power to detect attempts to exploit accounting-based overpricing is reduced.
Hence my first hypothesis, which I henceforth refer to as the Short Seller Exploitation
Hypothesis, or Hi, is formally stated as follows:
H1: Negative earnings surprises and income-increasing accruals should be
followed by high short interest. Furthermore, I expect the accruals and earnings
surprise effects to augment each other.
11.2 Shorting and Market Efficiency
"To enjoy the advantages of a free market, one must have both buyers and sellers,
both bulls and bears. A market without bears would be like a nation without a free
press. There would be no one to criticize and restrain the false optimism that always
leads to disaster. "
- Bernard Baruch, testimony before the Committee on Rules, House of
Representatives, January 1917.
This subsection develops my hypotheses on the relation between short interest and
price convergence. I first postulate that high short interest reduces the degree to
which the market is surprised by subsequent earnings announcements. I also
postulate that short interest expedites the rate at which prices move to the level where
they correctly reflect income-increasing accruals and negative earnings surprise.
If the efficient market hypothesis holds, rational speculative activity should eliminate
mispricing (Fama, 1965). There is a voluminous literature on different market
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participants exploiting anomalies, whether they are institutions, analysts, or insiders
(e.g. Collins, Gong, and Hribar, 2003; Ke and Gowda, 2004; Barth and Hutton, 2004;
Ayers and Freeman, 2003; Kolasinski and Li, 2004). However, less attention is paid
to short sellers, though shorts are an integral part of the market. If shorting causes
negative information contained in current earnings news to be better reflected in
prices, then under/overreaction to earnings/accruals should be more short-lived
among stocks with higher short interest ratios. On the other hand, even if short
interests are high, the presence of short sale constraints may not allow it to be high
enough to bring the price down. Therefore whether short interest is associated with
faster price declines remains an empirical question.
I examine the effect of short interest on pricing by testing two hypotheses, which I
discuss in sequence. The first of the two, which I label H2, is motivated by the fact
that current earnings contain information about future earnings. Hence if shorting
causes a stock's price to better reflect the current period's negative earnings surprise
and income-increasing accrual component, it should also cause the price to better
reflect rational expectations about future earnings. Hence my second hypothesis,
which I henceforth refer to as the Anticipation Enhancement Hypothesis, or H2, is
formally stated as follows:
H2: Stocks that experience a negative earnings surprise and income increasing
accruals and are subsequently heavily sold short will experience a less intense
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price reaction around future earnings announcements than those less heavily
sold short.
Underreaction to negative earnings surprise results in long-run negative abnormal
returns as prices tend move to the point at which they fully incorporate the negative
information. Likewise, mispricing of income-increasing accruals results in long run
negative abnormal returns as the market slowly begins to recognize that such accruals
are subject to reversal. If shorting, by reducing net demand, helps more quickly move
prices to their fiundamental value, it should cause such abnormal returns to be realized
sooner, especially during the time when short positions are accumulated. Hence my
third hypothesis, which I henceforth refer to as the Price Decline Expediting
Hypothesis, or H3, is formally stated as follows:
H3: High short interest should cause more of the long-run negative abnormal
return associated with negative earnings surprises and income-increasing
accruals to occur over a shorter horizon, particularly during the period when
short sellers establish their positions.
III. Data
This section outlines the sample selection procedure, defines the variables, and
describes the sample.
III.1. Sample Selection
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My sample selection procedure consists of the four stages outlined below.
First, I obtain quarterly earnings announcement dates for each non-financial
NASDAQ firm in the Compustat database with a December fiscal year-end over the
1995-2003 period.2 NASDAQ defines short interest as the total number of shares sold
short over a one-month period, and it makes this data publicly available on a monthly
basis from October 1995 to June 2004, inclusive. Hence, for each firm-quarter
observation, I obtain short interest data from NASDAQ for the nearest month-long
period that begins after the earnings announcement date.
Second, to calculate earnings surprise, I require firms to have at least six quarters of
data on earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. Six
consecutive quarters, from t-6 to t-l (the estimation period), are required to estimate
the parameter of the seasonal random-walk-with-drift model. I then use the model to
estimate expected earnings for quarter t (the event quarter). Earnings of quarter t are
required to compute the earnings surprise in the event quarter.
Third, to compute performance-matched discretionary accruals, I require each firm-
quarter observation to have data on earnings report dates, total assets, current assets,
cash, sales, accounts receivable, and current liabilities. I exclude from my sample all
firm-quarter observations for which there are fewer than ten industry peer firms,
,defined by 2-digit SIC codes, in that quarter in the entire Compustat universe.
2! I only include firms with December fiscal year end to get around Jhe seasonality issues arising from
quarterly accrual calculations.
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Finally, I obtain from CRSP daily returns over the period beginning four days prior to
the earnings announcement and ending 182 days after. These data requirements allow
me to compute the daily size-adjusted abnormal returns. The above criteria yield
39,955 firm-quarter observations covering 2,476 distinct firms.
111.2. Variable Definitions
III.2.1. Accruals:
I measure discretionary accruals by employing the Jones (1991) model using the
modifications suggested by DeFond and Jimbalvo (1994) and Dechow, et al. (1995).
In addition, following Kothari et al (2004) and Louis (2004), I adjust each firm's
discretionary accrual by subtracting the average discretionary accrual of a
performance-matched portfolio of firms. I now describe this procedure in detail.
First, I categorize firms into different industry groups based on their two-digit SIC
code. Next, I estimate the following cross-sectional regression model for each
industry group for each quarter:
A CC., (a i + a (ARE V.-ARECj,) (PPE+)
-a' TA a2 ( TA 1 - TAi ()
Where A CC = total accruals in the current quarter, which I measure as
the change in current assets net of change in cash, minus
the change in current liabilities, net of the change in the
current portion of long term debt.
TA = total assets at the beginning of the quarter;
AREV = change in revenue from the last quarter;
AREC = change in receivables from the last quarter;
PPE = gross PPE in the current quarter.
The residuals from the model correspond to firms' discretionary accruals in a given
quarter. Finally, for each quarter, I group firms into portfolios based on their return on
assets (ROA) and take the average discretionary accrual for each portfolio within
each quarter. The difference between an individuals firm's discretionary accrual for a
given quarter and the mean discretionary accrual of its corresponding ROA portfolio
is defined as its performance-matched discretionary accrual. I use performance-
matched discretionary accruals in all my tests, and henceforth refer to them simply as
"accruals."
I use the Louis (2004) procedure to calculate performance-matched accruals because
the alternative method suggested by Kothari et al (2004) is only applicable for a
small, random sample of firms. Kothari et al (2004) first randomly select a sample of
100 firms and then adjust the discretionary accruals for each sample firm by
subtracting the discretionary accrual of the firm outside the sample with the closest
ROA. So long as the sample is small and random, firms inside and outside the
sample with similar ROA are likely have comparable performance-related accruals,
and hence the adjustment is valid. However, this is not likely to be true where, as in
my case, the sample is large and non-random, and hence not representative of the
universe of firms. Since my sample includes all NASDAQ firms, a sample firm's
performance-related accrual is far more likely to be comparable to that of an ROA
portfolio taken from the whole COMPUSTAT universe than to that of an individual
firm not on NASDAQ.
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111.2.2. Standardized Unexpected Earnings:
Following Bernard and Thomas (1990), I assume earnings for each firm follow the
seasonal random-walk-with-drift process given below:E(Qi, ) = t-4+ ( +i (2)
Where Qit are the earnings for firm i in quarter t and i is the drift parameter. For
each firm-quarter observation, I estimate Si using a minimum of 6 quarters and a
maximum of 10 quarters of historical earnings data. I then estimate expected
earnings for quarter t using this parameter, and set unexpected earnings equal to
actual earnings less expected earnings. I also estimate the standard deviation of
unexpected earnings over this estimation period. Finally, I compute standardized
unexpected earnings (SUE) by dividing unexpected earnings by their standard
deviation. Thus SUE is defined by the equation below:
SUEit = (i, t - E (Qi,t )) / o Qi- E (Qi,t )] (3)
I use the seasonal random-walk-with-drift model rather than analyst forecasts to
estimate unexpected earnings because this method is the standard in the literature. In
addition, since many NASDAQ firms are not covered by analysts, I would lose an
unacceptably large number of observations if I were to use analyst forecasts to
estimate unexpected earnings.
111.2.3. Short Interest:
NASDAQ compiles and reports short interest as the total number of shares sold short
within the month-long period that ends as of the 15 th of each month or, if the 15th is
not a trading day, the last trading day before the 15th . I define relative short interest
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as short interest divided by the total number of shares outstanding as of the end of the
quarter. I expect short sellers to establish short positions in stocks with negative
earnings surprise and income-increasing discretionary accruals, which they should be
able to detect on the earnings announcement date. Thus, I restrict my attention to
short interest data corresponding to the nearest month-long period that begins after
the earnings announcement date to make sure that both earnings and accrual
information are publicly available before the recorded short positions are taken.
<Insert Figure 2 about here>
In Figure 2, I plot the equal-weighted mean short interest per share on a quarterly
basis over the interval 1995-2003 for all NASDAQ companies. As can be seen,
aggregate short interest per share declines substantially as the dot-corn bubble
expands upward from mid-1998 to its peak in early 2000; it then rebounds sharply as
the bubble explodes over the subsequent two years. Aside from this time-series
pattern, it is also worth noting that remarkably little short-selling takes place at any
point in the cycle. The aggregate NASDAQ short interest ratio averages 2.5 percent
over my sample period, and never exceeds 4 percent.
<Insert Figure 3 about here>
Figure 3 illustrates the histogram of relative short interest for the data panel. The
height of each bar indicates the number of firm-quarter observations for which
relative short interest is contained in the range indicated on the x axis. For example,
the first bar includes firm-quarters where the short position is greater than 0 but less
than 0.50%, and the second bar includes firm-quarters where the short position is
greater than 0.50% but less than 1.00%, and so on. The figure documents that the
distribution is highly skewed, with few firms having short positions in excess of 1.5
percent of shares outstanding.
111.2.4. Abnormal Returns
I apply return tests to analyze the influence of short selling activity on market
efficiency. I calculate the abnormal returns for my tests as follows.
First, following Bartov et al. (2000), I measure the market's reaction to earnings news
at the subsequent three earning announcement dates. Specifically, for each of the
quarters t+l through t+4, I measure the size-adjusted return during the three-trading-
day window around the earnings announcement. I denote the return around the
earnings announcement of quarter t+i for firm j as Rj(t+i). Designating the current
earnings announcement date as day 0, I begin each return window on the day before
the announcement to allow for information leakage and end it on day 1 to ensure that
the market has had enough time to react. I then sum the first three future quarterly
announcement returns and subtract the fourth future quarterly announcement return. I
define this quantity as REACT and I use it to test the impact of high short interest on
price convergence. React is thus given by the following equation:
REACT = +, + Rj( t+2) + Rj(t+3) - Rj(t+4) (4)
In view of the fact that current earnings contain information about future earnings, if
shorting causes a stock's price to better reflect the current period's negative earnings
surprise and income-increasing accrual component, it should also cause the price to
better reflect rational expectations about future earnings. Therefore holding bad
earnings news and income increasing accruals constant, stocks that are more heavily
i.
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sold short should experience a less negative price reaction around future earnings
announcement.
Secondly, I compute the cumulative size adjusted return over the period beginning on
day 2 and ending on day 180 for each firm-quarter and denote it as R180. This 180-
day period roughly corresponds to the period during which the bulk of abnormal
returns associated with PEAD and the accrual anomalies are realized (Defond and
Park, 2001). I also compute cumulative abnormal returns for the period beginning on
day 2 and ending one day before the short interest report date. I call this period the
short interest accumulation period and label the corresponding return as RsI.
<Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here>
If shorts improve the informational efficiency of the market by providing downside
price pressure, they should cause a greater proportion of the abnormal returns
associated with bad earnings news and income increasing accruals to be realized
sooner. Hence, holding R180 constant, I expect RsI to be more negative for stocks
whose short positions are more rapidly being accumulated.
111.3. Description of the Sample
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the final sample. I winsorize all the
variables at 1% and 99% level, except for the mktvalue variable, for which I use the
log value in the regression. As may be expected when accounting data are pooled
over time and across firms, variables do not have smooth distributions. To alleviate
problems associated with non-smooth distributions, in the tests that follow I use
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categorical classifications for the main explanatory variables (i.e., Suedecile and
Pmdadecile). The mean short interest per share is 2.2 percent, and the median is 0.4
percent. This is mainly due to the fact that a few firms have very high short interest.
The mean SUE is -0.03 and the median is 0.02, which are close, so the distribution is
approximately symmetric around the mean. The same is the true for performance-
matched discretionary accruals, which have a mean of 0.02 and a median of 0.00. The
market value variable is skewed to the right as evidenced by the large difference
between the mean (658.93) and median (106.04). This nonsymmetry is due to to the
presense of a small number of very large large firms, such as Microsoft. Trading
volume is also skewed to the right, indicating that a small number of firms have
relatively large trading activity. Book-to-Market ratio and all return variables are
approximately symmetric.
IV. Tests and Results
My analysis consists of two parts. First I examine whether high accruals and negative
earnings surprise are associated with high short interest. Second, I investigate whether
high short interest improves the pricing of unexpectedly low earnings and high
accruals. Below I discuss the details of how I test my hypotheses.
IV.1. Test of whether short interest is associated with negative SUE and income-
increasing accruals
As stated in section II. 1, my first hypothesis, in alternative form, is
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HI: Negative earnings surprises and income-increasing accruals should be
followed by high short interest, and the two effects should augment each other.
I test Hi by regressing short interest on SUE and Accrual deciles. I specify the
regression as follows:
sips = a + ,81 * suedecilerv + ,82 * pmdadecile + /,83* suedecilerv * pmdadecile
+,84 * Lnmv + 5 * BM + ,86 * Volps + 
Where sips := Short interest per share: the ratio of the number of shares
shorted in the month after quarterly earnings announcement,
deflated by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the
quarter;
suedecilerv Reversed decile rank of sue from 10 to 1, 10 being the lowest
sue and 1 being the highest;
pmdadecile Decile rank of pmda from 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest and 10
the highest;
Lnmv = Log of market value of equity for current quarter;
BM = Book-to-market ratio measured at the end of quarter t;
Volps = Trading volume: the average daily trading volume as
reported on the NASDAQ monthly short interest report
deflated by the number of shares outstanding.
I use the decile rankings of accruals and SUE, rather than their actual values, as
explanatory variables because their relations with short interest are unlikely to be
linear. To compute pmdadecile, for each calendar quarter I rank firms according to
their accruals. If a firm's accruals are in the highest decile for a given quarter,
pmdadecile will take on a value of ten, and if they are in the lowest decile,
pmdadecile will take on a value of one. To compute suedecilerv, for each quarter I
rank firms according to their SUE in descending order. Thus, if a firm's SUE is in
the highest decile, suedecilerv will take on a value of one, and if it is in the lowest
decile it will take on a value of ten. I order the SUE deciles in this manner so that
suedecilerv has the same directional effect on short interest as does pmdadecile.
19
HI predicts positive coefficients on the suedecilerv (/31) and on the pmdadecile (, 2)
since it postulates that low SUE and high accruals are associated with more short
selling. If the two effects augment each other, the interaction term
suedecilerv*pmdadecile (3) should be positive as well. The interaction term
captures the marginal effect of accruals on the slope of the earnings surprise and vice
versa.
I estimate equation (5) and all other regression models using the Fama-MacBeth
procedure. Thus I ensure that cross-sectional correlations in the error terms do not
bias my standard error estimates. To implement this procedure, I run cross-sectional
regressions for each calendar quarter and obtain a time series of coefficient estimates.
I then compute the mean and standard error for each coefficient from this time series.
In the above and all following regressions, I use three control variables LNMV, BM,
and VOLPS. I now discuss each of them below.
Size (LNMV)
Sias and Starks (1997) document that institutional ownership and firm size are
correlated. Large firms are likely to have high institutional ownership, which is in
turn correlated with the number of stocks available to be borrowed and sold short.
Thus, I use firm size to control for the availability of loanable shares in the
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regression. As a result, I expect 4 in equation (5) to be positive. I measure firm size
as the log of market value of equity at the end of the current quarter.
Book-to-market (BM)
Dechow et al. (2001) find that short sellers are most active in growth firms (as
measured by low book-to-market ratios). A low book-to-market ratio also indicates
that a firm may be overvalued and therefore a target for short sellers. I expect f5 in
equation (5) to be negative since B/M has been documented to be positively
associated with short selling.
Liquidity (VOLPS)
Stocks with high trading volume are more liquid. Graham, et al. (1999) argue that
short sellers are more likely to trade in stocks with lower transaction costs. Short
interest is expected to be higher for stocks with high trading volume. I include the
monthly average daily trading volume per share in the regression to control for
liquidity. I except the coefficient corresponding to this variable, /6 in equation (5) to
be positive.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Using a sample of 39,955 finns-quarters, I estimate model (5) using the previously
described Fama-MacBeth procedure. I estimate the quarterly cross-sectional analysis
using OLS. Table 2 reports the results. I find a significantly positive relation between
the reversed decile rank of SUE and the short interest level. The parameter estimate
of 0.0004 implies that if two stocks are similar except for one ranking difference in
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their standardized unexpected earnings, the stock with the lower SUE has short
interest that is on average 0.04 percentage points higher. I conclude that some short
selling is motivated by negative earnings surprise, confirming HI. The regression has
an R2 of 0.39, which seems reasonable.
The results also suggest that short interest is not regularly affected by performance-
matched accruals, confirming Richardson (2003), who finds similar results using two
different measures for accruals. The mean standard error of the coefficient on the
accruals decile is comparable to that of the SUE decile. Therefore power is unlikely
to be the reason for not finding a relation between accruals and short interest.
The estimated coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant, which suggests that
accruals do not augment the SUE effect on short interest. The estimated coefficients
on the control variables (firm size, Book-to-market, and liquidity) all have predicted
sign and are highly significant, both statistically and economically.
Since the relation between accounting variables and short interest may be non-linear,
I also employ logistic regression analysis to test Hi. Following Asquith et al. (2004),
I define a variable Highsi which equals 1 if short interest per share for a particular
firm-quarter observation falls above the 95t h percentile of the whole sample and zero
otherwise. I then estimate a logistic model in which I use Highsi as the dependent
variable and all the same independent variables that I used in the OLS analysis. Hi
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makes the same predictions for the logistic parameter estimates as it does for those of
the OLS analysis.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
Table 3 reports the results for the logistic model. Here, both earnings surprise and
accruals are statistically significant and have the predicted sign. The parameter
estimates for earnings surprise and accruals are 0.06 and 0.04, respectively, which
correspond to odds ratios of 1.06 and 1.04. Thus short interest is 6% and 4% more
likely to be high (i.e. above the 9 5 th percentile cutoff) when SUE falls one decile
lower and accruals rise one decile higher, respectively. The interactive term has the
wrong sign but is not statistically significant. Again, all the control variables have the
predicted sign and are significant. 3
Taken together, the OLS and Logistic analyses in Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence
that short interest can be partly explained by information about future earnings
contained in current quarter earnings, namely, earnings surprise and accruals. Next, I
proceed to investigate whether more intensive short selling activity improves the
pricing of these two anomaly indicators.
IV.2. Tests of whether shorting expedites price declines
I test H2 by estimating the following regression model:
3 The result for the accruals parameter is sensitive to how I define Highsi. If I define Highsi such that
it equals one when short interest per share is above some other cutoff points used in the short interest
literature, other than the 95 th percentile, I find that the accruals parameter ceases to be statistically
significant. Specifically, I find no statistically significant relation between Highsi and accruals when
using the 90th percentile as a cutoff point. I also find no relation when I define Highsi to equal one
when the value of SI is above 10%. -
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React = ar + ,,r sips + 2 suedecilerv + P3pmdadecile + 4sips *suedecilerv +
/,ssips*pmdadecile + controls + 
Where React
sips
suedecilerv
pmdadecile
The sum of the market reactions to earnings
announcements in the next three quarters, quarters t+ to
t+3, minus the market reaction to the earnings
announcement in quarter t+4. The market reaction in
each quarter is defined as the cumulative size-adjusted
return over the three trading day window that begins one
trading day before the earnings announcement;
Short interest per share: the ratio of the number of shares
shorted in the month after quarterly earnings
announcement, deflated by the number of shares
outstanding at the end of the quarter;
=: Reversed decile rank of sue from 10 to 1, 10 being the
lowest sue and 1 being the highest;
Decile rank of pmda from 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest and
10 the highest.
The interaction terms between sips and the two anomaly indicators capture the effect
of short interest on market reactions to future earnings announcements above and
beyond what is predicted by the accruals and earnings surprise variables. If high
short interest indeed reduces future negative price reaction of stocks that have
underreacted to earnings surprise or overreacted to accruals, I expect to find 84 and
/5 to be positive and statistically significant. Table 4 below contains the results of
my tests of H2.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
The results in Table 4 indicate that H2 is not supported. The coefficients for,84 and
5 are not significant. Furthermore, neither short interest per share norpmdadecile
is significant. This result is robust to different specifications for short interest (not
tabulated), including decile ranks and highsi dummies constructed with different
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(6)
cutoffs. Consistent with prior literature (Bernard and Thomas, 1990), the coefficient
that corresponds to suedecilerv is persistently negative and significant at the 1% level.
The parameter estimate of negative 0.0025 implies that if two stocks are similar
except for one ranking difference in their standardized unexpected earnings, the stock
with the lower SUE (higher suedecilerv) has future market reaction that is on average
more negative by 0.25 percentage points.
As discussed in section 2, hypothesis H3 postulates that high short interest following
earnings announcements should accelerate the realization of negative abnormal
returns that result from any mispricing of earnings information. In particular, more of
the negative abnormal return should be realized during the time in which short
interest is being accumulated. To test H3, I run the following regression:
Rs, = a + ,8,sips + /,32suedecilerv+,3pmdadecile+ 6R1 80 + controls + £ (7)
Where R = Cumulative, size-adjusted return over the period
sips
suedecilerv
pmdadecile
beginning 2 days after the earnings announcement and
ending 1 day before the first short interest reporting date
that comes after the earnings announcement date;
Short interest per share: the ratio of the number of shares
shorted in the month after quarterly earnings
announcement, deflated by the number of shares
outstanding at the end of the quarter;
= Reversed decile rank of sue from 10 to 1, 10 being the
lowest sue and 1 being the highest;
Decile rank of pmda from 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest and
10 the highest.
I start the short interest accumulation period two days after the earnings
announcement to allow for initial reaction and digestion of the earnings information.
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I end the period one day before the short interest report date to remove the price
reaction to the short interest information itself.
To identify the effect of shorting on the speed of the price convergence, I examine the
effect of sips on Ri controlling for the 180 day abnormal return (R180).4 Thus I test
whether higher sips causes more of the abnormal return during the 180 day period to
get realized during the short interest accumulation period. If high short interest
indeed expedites price convergence, I expect to find /l3 to be negative and
statistically significant.
I run the regression with and without the two anomaly indicators because they also
predict Rs, to some extent. However, as shown in table 5, their influence on RsI is
swamped by that of R180.
<Insert Table 5 about here>
Results in Table 5 support H3. The coefficient on short interest per share is negative
and significant most of the time as predicted by the model (Columns 2 - 5). In all but
one regression, it equals approximately -0.21. A coefficient estimate of this
magnitude implies that if two stocks are similar except for a one percentage point
difference in their short interest per share, the stock with the higher short interest will
experience a cumulative abnormal return lower by 21 percentage points while short
interest is being accumulated. Note that the coefficient on short interest is not
4 The 180 day period roughly corresponds to the period during which the bulk of the negative
abnormal returns predicted by the two anomalies get realized.
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significant in the regression where R180 is omitted as a control (column 1). Thus
short selling does not drive the price unconditionally.
One complication arises when testing the effect of shorting on prices convergence to
fundamental values - both factors are endogenously determined. If short sellers short
stocks that are more likely to have a speedy price decline, I expect a negative relation
between the speed of price decline and short interest, even if the latter has no effect
on the former. Thus my finding that the two are negatively correlated two could be
interpreted either as evidence that shorting improves pricing, or that short sellers are
better able to spot overpriced stocks that are likely to have a quicker price decline.
Distinguishing between these two competing hypotheses would require finding
instruments that help determine short interest but not the speed of price convergence.
One potential candidate is the supply of loanable shares, which is highly proprietary. I
leave the task of disentangling this endogenity problem to future research.
V. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the short interest literature on both the determinants of and
the consequences of short interest. It is the first to document that short sellers, trading
after the earnings announcement, attempt to exploit market underreaction to negative
earnings surprise. In contrast to Christophe, et al. (2004), who document that short
sellers anticipate earnings surprise, I find that short sellers trade on earnings news
even after it has been made public. This paper is also the first to test how PEAD and
accruals jointly affect short interest, in contrast to Zhang and Cready (2004) and
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Richardson (2003), who test the effect of accruals in isolation. Finally, this paper is
the first to test and provide limited evidence that short sellers help move prices to
levels where they better reflect earnings information.
To the extent it documents how shorting affects price formation in the presence of
mispricing anomalies, this paper should interest policy makers. Effective January 3,
2005, the SEC has adopted the suspension of the current "up-tick" rule, among other
changes, to reduce the cost associated with shorting ("Regulation SHO"). My finding
that short-sellers appear to have a beneficial effect on the informational efficiency of
prices has direct bearing on the importance of this reform.
This last finding, however, is not strong. I find that stocks with negative abnormal
returns following an earnings announcement tend to see those returns get realized
more quickly if short interest is high. This result could indicate that short sellers help
move prices to fundamental value more quickly. Unfortunately, it could also indicate
that, holding overpricing constant, short sellers tend to pick those overpriced stocks
that are likely to converge more quickly. Differentiating between these equally
plausible interpretations of my results requires finding instrumental variables that
help determine short interest but do not affect the speed of price convergence. One
possible instrument would be the supply of loanable shares. I leave it to future
researchers to find and utilize such instruments.
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I also do not find that greater short interest causes prices to better anticipate future
earnings surprises. This result, however, is also far from conclusive. The failure to
reject the null in this case may be due to measurement error in my short interest
variable, which would tend to bias the estimated effect to short interest toward zero.
The lump-sum short interest data I use is highly noisy and of low frequency. In
addition, as previously indicated, a large proportion of short interest reflects many
institutions shorting for technical reasons that have nothing to do with them having
bearish views about a stock. Only when clean measures of bearish shorting are found
can the costs and benefits of shorting be well assessed. Unfortunately, refining the
short interest variable requires highly proprietary data, which is beyond the scope of
current paper. One potential refinement would include distinguishing between
different shorting types, such as market maker shorting and. speculative shorting. I
leave it to future research to further explore such data refinements.
The power of my tests could be improved by controlling for factors that make stocks
more or less difficult to short. For instance, it would be useful to control for whether
stocks have traded option or convertible securities since such securities reduce the
costs of shorting. Institutional holdings could be used to control for the supply of
loanable shares. Finally, it would be useful to add controls for the level of
information asymmetry, such as analyst following. I leave it to future researchers to
explore these power-enhancement possibilities.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for variables used in subsequent tests.
a firm-quarter observation must have sufficient data to compute the below
quarter observations are drawn from the period between 1995 and 2003.
To be included in this table,
displayed variables. Firm-
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl Maximum
sips 39955 0.0223 0.04 0.0000 0.0004 0.0043 0.0228 0.2559
sue 39955 -0.03 1.11 -2.67 -0.72 0.02 0.71 2.66
pmda 39955 0.02 0.11 -0.16 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.32
mktvalue 39261 658.93 6051.43 0.16 36.81 106.04 334.54 448788.94
bm 39955 0.63 0.63 0.00 0.21 0.44 0.82 3.44
volps 39955 0.0087 0.01 0.0000 0.0015 0.0040 0.0096 0.0913
React 28741 1.49% 0.25 -264.25% -11.55% 1.01% 14.10% 350.90%
Rsi 39955 1.22% 0.23 -60.12% -11.15% 0.20% 12.35% 77.85%
R180 39955 -5.96% 0.61 -114.85% -35.04% 0.09% 28.90% 164.16%
Variable Definitions
sips Short interest per share: the ratio of the number of shares shorted in the month after
quarterly earnings announcement, deflated by the number of shares outstanding at the end
of the quarter.
sue Standardized unexpected earnings: seasonally differenced quarterly earnings divided by
the standard deviation of the forecast error.
pmda Perfomance-matched discretionary accruals.
mktvalue Market value of equity, in $millions, measured at the end of quarter t.
bm Book-to-market ratio measured at the end of quarter t.
volps Trading volume: the average daily trading volume as reported on the NASDAQ monthly
short interest report deflated by the number of shares outstanding.
React The sum of the market reactions to earnings announcements in the next three quarters,
quarters t+1 to t+3, minus the market reaction to the earnings announcement in quarter
t+4. The market reaction in each quarter is defined as the cumulative size-adjusted return
over the three trading day window that begins one trading day before the earnings
announcement.
Rsi Cumulative, size-adjusted return over the period beginning 2 days after the earnings
announcement and ending 1 day before the first short interest reporting date that comes
after the earnings announcement date.
R180 Cumulative, size-adjusted return over the 180-day period beginning 2 days after the
earnings announcement in quarter t and ending 182 days after.
Table 2
OLS Regression analysis testing the Short Seller Exploitation Hypothesis (H1)
sips = a + /,8 *suedecilerv + ,82 * pmdadecile + /3 * suedecilerv * pmdadecile + ,84 * Lnmv + ,85 * BM + /,6 * Volps +E
This table presents test results for the hypothesis that high short sellers exploit market under-reaction and
overreaction to negative earnings surprise and income-increasing accruals, respectively. The table contains
time-series means of coefficients and adjusted R2s produced by 34 quarterly cross-sectional OLS
regressions using the model shown above. Standard errors are in parentheses and asterisks indicate one-
sided statistical significance. There are a total of 39,955 observations in the sample. The time period is
from 1995 to 2003. The intercept and coefficients on industry indicators are not reported.
Variable Predicted Sign Mean
suedecilerv + 0.0004 ***
(0.0002)
pmdadecile + 0.0002
(0.0001)
suedecilerv*pmdadecile + 0.0000
(0.0000)
lnmv + 0.0054 ***
(0.0003)
bm -0.0030 ***
(0.0003)
volps + 1.6455 ***
(0.0850)
Adjusted R square 38.56%
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
Variable Definitions
sips Short interest per share: the ratio of the number of shares shorted in the month after
quarterly earnings announcement, deflated by the number of shares outstanding at the end
of the quarter.
suedecilerv Reversed decile rank of sue from 10 to 1, 10 being the lowest sue and 1 being the highest.
This is done to ensure the interaction term of sue and pmda have the same directional
effect on the dependent variable.
pmdadecile Decile rank of pmda from 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest and 10 the highest.
lnmv Log of market value of equity for current quarter.
bm Book-to-market ratio measured at the end of quarter t.
volps Trading volume: the average daily trading volume as reported on the NASDAQ monthly
short interest report deflated by the number of shares outstanding.
Table 3
Nonlinear regression analysis testing the Short Seller Exploitation Hypothesis (H1)
HighSI = a + A3 * suedecilerv + / 2 * pmdadecile + /33 * suedecilerv * pmdadecile + ,64 * Lnmv + l3 * BM + /36 * Volps + e
This table presents test results for the hypothesis that high short sellers exploit market under-reaction and
overreaction to negative earnings surprise and income-increasing accruals, respectively. The table contains
time-series means of coefficients produced by 34 quarterly cross-sectional logistic regressions using the
model shown above. Standard errors are in parentheses and asterisks indicate one-sided statistical
significance. There are a total of 39,955 observations in the sample. The time period is from 1995 to 2003.
The intercept and coefficients on industry indicators are not reported.
Independent Variables Predicted Sign Mean
suedecilerv + 0.0595 **
(0.0238)
pmdadecile + 0.0426 **
(0.0185)
suedecilerv*pmdadecile + -0.0036
(0.0035)
lnmv + 0.3057 ***
(0.0321)
bm - -1.8870 ***
(0.1618)
volps + 57.1810 ***
(2.9433)
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
Variable Definitions
highsi High short interest dummy variable which equals 1 if short interest per share is above 95
percent of the sample distribution and zero otherwise.
suedecilerv Reversed decile rank of sue from 10 to 1, 10 being the lowest sue and 1 being the highest.
This is done to ensure the interaction term of sue and pmda have the same directional
effect on the dependent variable.
pmdadecile Decile rank of pmda from 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest and 10 the highest.
lnmv Log of market value of equity for current quarter.
bm Book-to-market ratio measured at the end of quarter t.
volps Trading volume: the average daily trading volume as reported on the NASDAQ monthly
short interest report deflated by the number of shares outstanding.
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